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1. Introduction                   
 
1.1 Quality in work: More jobs through better jobs 
 
Within Europe the aim of promoting the quality of available work, along with that 
of creating full employment, has recently risen to the top of the political agenda.  
“Previously, during periods of low employment rates, the emphasis was on job 
creation.  Quantity took precedence over the quality – the nature and content – of the 
jobs created” (Eurofound, 2002, p.3).  Following, however, the Conclusions of the 
Extraordinary European Council in Lisbon (2000), which were subsequently 
reaffirmed by the Social Policy Agenda approved by the Council of Nice (2000), 
Member States adopted the goal of improving quality in work as a complementary and 
mutually supportive objective to those of full employment and social cohesion.  
Quality promotion was therefore firmly established as one of the three overarching 
objectives of the EU’s Employment Guidelines for the period 2003-2005. 
Indeed, this renewed focus on job quality was deemed necessary for confronting 
the profound challenges resulting from Europe’s transition to a competitive and 
knowledge-based economy.  In light of the increased globalisation of economic 
activity, rapid technological, social, and demographic change, the ongoing 
restructuring of workplace organization, as well as the need to combat Europe’s 
persistent long-term unemployment problem, new and flexible employment patterns 
were deployed as a means of providing employers with adequate leeway to respond to 
ever-changing circumstances.  Sabethai (2000), for example, documents the 
widespread use of such flexible forms of work (e.g. shifts, overtime, part-time 
employment, contracts of temporary duration, seasonal employment etc.) in Greece in 
the late 1990s, as well as numerous legislative measures concerning the utilisation of 
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labour, that sought to adapt employment and production needs of Greek enterprises to 
changes in demand.  Nonetheless, while the shift towards atypical forms of 
employment may have favoured job creation and the adjustment of the economy to 
cyclical fluctuations, concerns were expressed regarding the potential downsides in 
terms of job quality, such as the impact on job security, work-life balance, possibilities 
of further training and career prospects, health and safety at work etc.  It was within 
this context that some commentators claimed that quantity-quality trade-offs exist, and 
that quality improvements can have negative effects, leading to either increases in 
labour costs or obstacles to hiring and firing and/or wage flexibility (Employment in 
Europe, 2002, p. 81).    
Concerns about job quality also came to the fore following the strong evidence of a 
close link between quality in work, on the one hand, and labour market segmentation 
and social exclusion, on the other.  Employment in Europe 2001 was the first to argue 
that those employed in jobs of relatively poor quality, which combine low skills with 
temporary or precarious work and lack of career development opportunities, are at 
much higher risk of job loss or of dropping out of the labour force.  Moreover, 
“previous experience of unemployment and labour market exclusion, in turn, lowers 
the probability of returning to employment in general and into high quality 
employment in particular, thus leading to substantial risk of vicious circles of low 
quality – low productivity employment, and unemployment, inactivity and social 
exclusion” (Employment in Europe, 2002).  Indeed, Employment in Europe 2003 (p. 
138) reports for Greece that between 1995 and 2000 it was among the EU countries 
with the least favourable career opportunities for people in low-quality employment, 
with above EU-average transition rates into unemployment, and below EU-average 
transition into high quality employment.  Also striking is the persistence of the no 
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job/low quality trap in Greece, with almost 30 percent of unemployed Greeks in 1999 
moving into low-quality employment in 2000, and almost 20 percent in inactivity.  
Little above 5 percent moved into high-quality jobs.   
The fear of a vicious cycle between low-quality jobs and non-employment was 
further exacerbated by the possibility that the trend of increasing employment in the 
services sector would lead to a proliferation of dead-end jobs of bad quality.  For 
Greece, in particular, which has experienced rapid growth of the services sector over 
the past twenty years, it has been argued that the demand for high profitability by 
Greek firms, in the face of slow growth of productivity and high unemployment, has 
enabled the propagation of low-wage/bad jobs in the Greek economy (Ioakimoglou 
and Soumeli, 2002).   
The focus of the EU on job quality was also stimulated by the acknowledgement 
that the full potential of job creation cannot be achieved if the jobs on offer are 
unattractive in terms of quality of work, consequently proving difficult to fill 
(Eurofound, 2001, p. 4).  This problem has recently become starker in European labour 
markets, as marked improvements in the quality of the European labour supply have 
been met by an increasing demand for high-quality jobs, characterised by reasonable 
pay, high skill requirements, relative job security, work-life balance, access to training 
and possibilities for career advancement (European Commission, 2001, p. 9).  An 
acute example of this phenomenon can be found in Greece, whereby a common 
complaint on behalf of Greek employers is that the large stock of young educated 
Greek workers are unwilling to take up jobs that are perceived by them as of bad 
quality.  These jobs, instead, are regarded as suitable for low-skilled economic 
immigrants only. 
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Finally, placing greater emphasis on job quality was also dictated by the evidence 
that better quality in work results in faster employment growth and higher productivity 
(European Commission, 2003, p. 6-8).  Specifically, better jobs are expected to be 
more attractive to non-participants, especially women.  Safer jobs that offer access to 
training are also more likely to result in productivity gains, by reducing turnover and 
absenteeism and by leading to the production of better goods and services, 
respectively.  At the same time employees are likely to reciprocate to their employer’s 
gift-exchange offer of better working conditions by exerting greater effort (much in the 
spirit of the ‘reciprocity’ arguments put forward by Fehr and Falk (2004)).  
Furthermore, high-quality employment is also believed to contribute to the positive 
mental and psychical well-being of employees, thus serving as a precondition for a 
rich, satisfying, and productive life (Eurofound, 2001, p. 7).   
It is not least for these reasons that European decision-makers in the Barcelona 
European Council (2002) sought for more and better jobs, stressing that the objective 
of creating better jobs complements and reinforces that of creating more jobs.  Quality 
promotion was hence acknowledged as a cornerstone for modernising Europe’s social 
model, as a means of ensuring the dynamic positive complementarity between flexible 
and competitive economic policies, on the one hand, and social cohesion, achieved 
through strong and supportive social systems, on the other.  Fostering more jobs 
through better jobs thus became a key element for achieving the EU’S strategic goal, 
proclaimed in the Lisbon 2000 Summit, to become the most competitive and dynamic 
knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with 
more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.      
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1.2 Low-paid workers and the two-tier labour market  
 
Along with the increased emphasis on work quality, the strong rise in earnings 
inequality in some countries since the late 1980s also raised concerns that this could 
result in a growing proportion of the workforce falling into the category of the 
‘working poor’.  In fact, within the EU there was an attempt to link the declining 
relative (and sometimes real) position of low-paid workers with the perceived low 
quality of work, with the Commission arguing that such low-paid jobs suffer a double 
penalty as they are also of low quality (Jones and Sloane, 2004, p. 2).  In other words, 
it was asserted that in the context of skill-biased technological change, growing 
international trade with low-wage countries, and deregulation of the traditional 
institutional framework that supported the wages of low-skilled workers (trade unions, 
centralized collective bargaining, minimum wages etc.), a two-tier labour market was 
fostered in Europe.  In this dual market “the first tier is made up of jobs subject to 
decent pay, relative job security and career prospects, involving generally good 
working conditions.  The second tier comprises not only the unemployed and 
discouraged workers, but also those employed in jobs of low quality which have low 
pay, precarious employment relationships or lack of further education and career 
development prospects” (Employment in Europe, 2001, p. 79).  In light of this alleged 
segmentation, one report put forward the claim that “policies towards low-wage jobs 
should centre on their quality at least as importantly as on the level of pay which they 
provide” (Salverda et. al., p. xi; cited in Leontaridi and Sloane, 2004, p. 1).    
Of course, the theoretical framework underlying the EU’s rationale of low wage 
jobs also being of low quality is the dual labour market hypothesis.  According to this 
theory, the lack of perfect mobility, and subsequent lack of competition, between 
distinct labour markets fosters the development of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs, whereby the 
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former enjoy not only better working conditions than the latter, but also higher pay.  In 
this case significant differences in the utility derived from work among otherwise 
identical individuals arise, with those in superior jobs enjoying greater job satisfaction.  
Such differences cannot be sustained, however, in markets that are characterised by a 
perfect flow of information and lack of barriers to mobility.  For in that case Adam 
Smith’s (1776) paradigm of compensating wage differentials would prevail.  
According to Smith, employers of jobs with many disamenities would be expected in 
the long run to compensate for these with higher pay, all other things equal, in order to 
recruit and retain their workers.  Thus, according to the theory of compensating (or 
equalizing) differences, in perfectly competitive labour markers one expects to observe 
low-paid jobs with relatively good working conditions, and jobs with bad working 
conditions paying high wages.  Two otherwise similar individuals, who have the same 
demographic, human capital, and job characteristics, but who work in different tiers 
(i.e. one as low-paid and the other as high-paid), should therefore enjoy similar utility 
from their jobs.          
    This study therefore attempts, firstly, to detect whether or not significant 
differences in perceived job quality exist among high and low-paid workers in Greece, 
and, secondly, to uncover the differential effect that certain socio-economic variables 
exert on the utility from high or low-paid work, respectively.  By understanding if (and 
how) the determinants of job satisfaction between low-paid and high-paid workers 
differ, appropriate policy responses could then be developed to address the difference 
in quality between good and bad jobs.  To do so we follow the practice of an ever-
increasing number of economists who use self-reported job satisfaction data to proxy 
the overall quality of work as perceived by the individual worker.  This is the approach 
of Leontaridi and Sloane (2001), who have shown with British data that low-paid 
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workers in the UK report greater job satisfaction than their higher paid counterparts, 
presumably because the former obtain compensation in the form of non-pecuniary 
benefits.  Jones and Sloane (2004) have also recently illustrated that job satisfaction in 
the low-wage economy of Wales is not lower than the rest of the UK.  In a similar 
spirit to these studies, this paper shows that low-paid workers in Greece are 
significantly less satisfied with their jobs, compared to equivalent higher paid workers, 
based on data from eight waves (1994-2001) of the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP).  Further analysis of the specific facets of jobs reveals that this 
discrepancy is the result of greater dissatisfaction among low wage employees with 
their pay and the type of work that they perform.               
The structure of the paper is therefore organized as follows.  Section 2 begins by 
describing the different attempts that have been made to quantify the concept of job 
quality, one of which is the use of self-reported survey responses on job satisfaction.  
Since we adopt this approach for the rest of the paper, section 3 offers a brief literature 
review of the growing research that has taken place using subjective well-being data.  
In section 4 the data used in this study and summary statistics are presented.  Section 5 
provides a simplified account of the econometric methodology and describes the 
empirical estimates of the relationship between low pay status and job satisfaction in 
Greece, while section 6 offers some policy recommendations.  Section 7 concludes the 
discussion.  For those interested in the technical details of estimation, an extensive 
discussion of the model specification and econometric methodology can be found in 
the Appendix.    
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2. Defining Quality in Work 
 
Quality in work is a multifaceted concept, which makes any attempt to quantify the 
term highly contentious.  The broadest description has been offered by Employment in 
Europe 2001 (p. 65), which defined job quality as “a relative concept regarding a job-
worker relationship, which takes into account both objective characteristics related to 
the job and the match between worker characteristics, on the one hand, and job 
requirements, on the other.  It also involves subjective evaluation of these 
characteristics by the respective worker on the basis of his or her characteristics, 
experience, and expectations”.  As is evident from the above definition, the difficulty 
of precisely assessing some of these elements explains the lack of any agreed 
definition of job quality among academics and policy-makers.  In fact, it is for this 
reason that the Commission (2001, p. 7) has suggested that “given its relative and 
multidimensional nature, there can be no one single measure or index of employment 
quality”, which, in turn, implies that “an empirical analysis of job quality has to be 
based on data on both objective job and worker characteristics and subjective 
evaluations of the job-worker match” (Employment in Europe, 2001, p. 65).  The 
Commission went on to suggest a set of indicators covering 10 main elements of 
quality within two broad categories – the characteristics of the job itself, and the work 
and wider labour market context.  These include: intrinsic job quality; skills, lifelong 
learning and career development; gender equality; health and safety at work; flexibility 
and security; inclusion and access to the labour market; work organization and work-
life balance; social dialogue and worker involvement; diversity and non-
discrimination; and overall work performance.  
  Due to the complexity associated with evaluating and monitoring all of these 
indicators, however, most studies have focused on a subset of the more easily 
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quantifiable measures of job quality.  The Commission itself has classified jobs 
according to certain key objective characteristics, such as job security, training 
possibilities and career prospects, and productivity and pay.  Based on these three 
criteria, it distinguished jobs into four types: “dead-end jobs”, “jobs of reasonable 
quality”, “low pay/productivity jobs” and, finally, “jobs of good quality” (Employment 
in Europe, 2001, p. 74).  Using this grouping, it showed that while a majority of jobs in 
the EU are of relatively high quality, a quarter of the workforce remain in jobs of 
lower quality, and that Spain and Greece, in particular, show above average 
employment shares of individuals in both “low pay/productivity jobs” and “dead-end 
jobs” (ibid., p. 75). 
More recently economists have followed a different approach to the issue of 
measuring job quality, one that is based on self-reported satisfaction data from 
individual questionnaires.  Specifically, many have argued that since overall subjective 
job satisfaction is the reflection of the worker’s weighting in his/her mind of all the 
job’s aspects (such as pay, job security, the type of work, hours and times of work, 
working conditions, commuting etc.), “then the former should serve as a reasonable 
proxy for the overall quality of work as perceived by the individual worker” 
(Hamermesh, 2001; Leontaridi and Sloane, 2004, p. 2).  Indeed, the strength of this 
approach seems to lie in the fact that subjective assessments of job satisfaction have 
been found to be strong predictors of worker behaviour, such as quits, absenteeism, 
and worker productivity (Freeman, 1978; Clegg, 1983; inter alia).  It is this method 
that we will therefore adopt for the rest of this study. 
3. Subjective Job Satisfaction 
 
3.1 Subjective Well-Being and Job Satisfaction 
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There has been a surge of interest among economists in recent years regarding the 
use of subjective survey questions on individuals’ well-being and its domains, such as 
job satisfaction or health satisfaction.  As mentioned above, much research has now 
started with the premise that subjective well-being (SWB) can serve as an empirical 
proxy for the theoretical concept of utility, thus overcoming the traditional economic 
practice of evaluating individual preferences by means of revealed behaviour in market 
situations.  This initiative has followed the lead of many years of psychological 
research, which illustrated that comparisons of different measures of SWB are often 
mutually consistent.  For example, self-reported SWB has been found to be correlated 
with physiological measures such as the amount of smiling or frowning, changes in 
facial muscles (see Kahneman et al., 1999) or the evaluation of the individual’s 
experience by a third party observer (Kahneman et al., 1997).  Van Praag (1991) has 
also shown that individuals belonging to the same language community have a very 
similar understanding of concepts such as welfare, well-being and happiness.  In 
addition, the use of subjective well-being data was encouraged by the robust 
econometric findings that were spurred by Freeman’s (1978) pioneering work on the 
inverse relationship between job satisfaction and quit behaviour.   
Of course, it has been acknowledged that survey questions about satisfaction suffer 
from a number of weaknesses, such as the discrepancy between remembered utility 
and experienced utility.  For example, it has been argued that when evaluating 
retrospectively the utility of an event (remembered utility), individuals give a relatively 
higher weight to events with a high intensity (Peak Effect) and those that have 
occurred last (End Effect) (hence the term Peak-End evaluation rule, which was 
coined by that the Nobel-prize winner Kahneman).  Another problem arises due to the 
presence of the adaptation phenomenon (Easterlin, 2001).  Specifically, the evidence 
of wealthier individuals and economies being happier at a given point in time, but not 
over time, has led to the assertion that individuals adapt to new situations, such as an 
income increase or becoming handicapped, by changing their expectations.  Both of 
these issues therefore arouse suspicion concerning the use of time-series data on 
subjective happiness.   
In spite of these problems, economists have reported a number of interesting and 
robust results regarding the effect of individual socio-economic characteristics on 
SWB and its domains.  Concentrating specifically on the domain of job satisfaction, 
which is taken as a proxy of the individual’s utility from work (U), most of the 
empirical literature now follows the theoretical exposition of Clark and Oswald (1996).  
According to these authors, job satisfaction depends not only on absolute income (y) 
and working hours (h), as in standard indifference curve microeconomics, but also on a 
set of individual (i) and job-specific (j) features:  
 
0,0),,,( <′>′= hy uujihyuU  (1) 
 
 
Based on this model, the estimating equations usually regress the indices of job 
satisfaction on a set of demographic (age, gender, marital status, number of children 
etc.), human capital (education, training), economic (wages and salaries, other 
income), work-related (firm size, hours of work, contractual arrangement), and social 
(unionization, institutions) determinants.  In this manner the literature has found that 
unemployed individuals report substantially lower levels of well-being than the 
employed and are permanently ‘scarred’ as a result of their jobless experience (Clark 
and Oswald, 1994; Theodossiou, 1998).  It has also been argued that much of the wage 
effect on job satisfaction operates through relative wages (Clark and Oswald, 1996; 
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Clark, 1999; Grund and Sliwka, 2003), or through the individual’s own judgement 
about his past and future financial situation (Easterlin, 2001; Lydon and Chevalier, 
2002).4  Interesting demographic differences have emerged in that women consistently 
declare higher job satisfaction scores than men (Clark, 1997) and the age effect has 
been reported as being U-shaped with middle-aged people being the least satisfied 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999).  Finally, satisfaction levels have been found to be 
negatively correlated with both education (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Sloane and 
Williams, 1996) and union status (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1999; Drakopoulos and 
Theodossiou, 1997).5  
 
3.2 Greek Specific Research on Job Satisfaction6
In Greece the empirical research on job satisfaction is limited, with most of the 
relevant studies originating in the health sciences.  Recent papers that have focused on 
the job satisfaction of Greek teachers include those of Koustelios (2001) and Stamouli 
and Ipfling (2003).  Koustelios’s (2001) sample of 345 teachers from 40 public schools 
in Thessaloniki showed that they are satisfied with the job itself and supervision, while 
they are dissatisfied with their pay and promotion opportunities.  Holding a 
 
4 In this case researchers assume a utility function that depends not only on absolute income, but also on 
relative income i.e. U = u(y, y*, h, i, j), where y* is the reference level of income against which the 
individual compares his/her own earnings.  The idea is that utility either declines with an increase in 
comparison income when this gives rise to feelings of relative deprivation, or increases when higher 
wages of co-workers are regarded as a signal of a higher potential wage for the individual himself (what 
is known as the ‘tunnel effect’ - see Panos, Theodossiou and Nicolaou (2004) for an empirical 
investigation of these two hypotheses).  Contention exists, though, among economists as to what is 
exactly the comparison benchmark.  While Clark and Oswald (1996) have defined it as the 
econometrically predicted ‘going rate’ for the job, that is the income of comparable employees of given 
characteristics, Clark (1999) and Grund and Sliwka (2003) have recently argued that it is the wage of the 
prior period that serves as reference.   
5 Though difficult to test, several hypotheses for these facts have been put forward.  For example, it has 
been argued that more educated workers are less satisfied since education raises aspiration targets.  The 
lower ceteris paribus satisfaction of union workers has been attributed to voice mechanisms that allow 
workers to express their dissatisfaction, or to the fact that dissatisfaction is used by unions as a means to 
increase demands.   
6 This section is heavily based on the literature review for Greece (Annex 3) that was undertaken as part 
of the EPICURUS project by Panos, G. A. and Vasileiou, E. at the University of Macedonia. 
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supervisory post or having promotion prospects also appears to have a positive effect 
on job satisfaction.  Stamouli and Ipfling’s (2003) cross-national research of four 
countries (Greece, Germany, Austria, Switzerland) also revealed that teachers with 
greater work autonomy, and those with good working conditions (such as 
administrative support, school environment, student acknowledgement), are more 
satisfied in all countries.  A notable difference is that for Greek teachers the vacation 
period seems to be more relevant for their job satisfaction compared to their Central 
European counterparts.          
Two more studies worth mentioning include those of Blanchflower and Oswald 
(1999) and Kaiser (2002), both of which examine job satisfaction in the whole of 
Europe including Greece.  Blanchflower and Oswald (1999), using information from 
two waves (1995 and 1996) of the Eurobarometer survey, show that job satisfaction 
levels in Greece are the lowest in the EU, and Greece appears to be one of the most 
stressed countries in Europe.  Kaiser (2002) confirms these results using data from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for the period 1994-1997.  According 
to Kaiser, Greeks have the lowest average satisfaction in the EU with respect to their 
jobs in general, as well as with two specific aspects of their jobs, notably the number 
of working hours and job security.  Such a bleak picture also emerges from the 
empirical analysis of this paper, to which we now turn.          
4. Statistical Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
4.1 Data and Description of Main Variables 
The empirical analysis uses statistical data for Greece drawn from the eight waves 
of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), covering the period 1994-
2001.  Designed centrally at Eurostat, but in close coordination with the Member 
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States, the ECHP is a questionnaire database that contains information on more than 
60,000 nationally representative households and 120,000 observations per year for all 
(pre-accession) EU countries.7  In constructing the ECHP emphasis was placed on 
developing comparable social statistics across Member States on income, labour, 
poverty and social exclusion, housing, health, as well as other social indicators 
concerning living conditions of private households and persons.  More important for 
our purposes, it contains a considerable amount of information on the personal, human 
capital and employment characteristics of workers, as well as their stated satisfaction 
with their jobs.  In particular, in the ECHP respondents are asked to rate their 
satisfaction levels with their main activity status (whether it is employment, 
unemployment, or inactivity).  The employed are also asked to state their preference 
with respect to specific components of their jobs, such as earnings, job security, type 
of work, working hours, working times, working conditions/environment and distance 
to job/commuting.  Each of these are given a number from one to six, where a value of 
one corresponds to ‘not satisfied at all’, six reflects ‘full satisfaction’, and the integers 
from two to five represent intermediate levels of utility.  It is these self-reported 
responses that constitute the dependent variables in the econometric analysis that 
follows below.   
Using the available ECHP data on Greece, the total number of interviewees for each 
of the eight years of the survey was approximately 11,000, resulting in a total of 
85,748 observations on 15,374 individuals for the pooled sample.8  Keeping only those 
 
7 In the first wave of the ECHP (1994) the sample comprised of 60,500 representative households and 
130,000 interviewees aged 16 years or over, from 12 Member States.  From 1995 onwards Austria was 
also included, and from 1996 and 1997 Finland and Sweden, respectively, joined the survey as well.  
8 The decision to pool the eight years of data was made in order to maximise the number of observations 
in the sample, and to control for certain unobservable effects that change over time but are constant 
across individuals (such as inflation and other political and economic disturbances within the country).  
This is achieved via the inclusion of yearly dummy variables in the econometric analysis. 
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in paid employment, who are between 16 and 65 years of age, and excluding the self-
employed and those in unpaid work in family enterprises for the purpose of retaining 
homogeneity in the sample, resulted in a pooled sample of 20,785 observations on 
5,314 individuals, of which 3,162 are males and 2,152 are females.  Although our 
sample excludes full-time students, those working in paid apprenticeship or those 
receiving job-related training were included, given that training possibilities constitute 
a key component of the quality of jobs.   
As the main focus of this study is on investigating whether significant differences in 
job satisfaction exist between high and low-paid workers in Greece, we then proceeded 
to identify the fraction of Greek employees who are low-paid in the ECHP.  In doing 
so, we firstly derived gross hourly earnings for each individual in the sample, by using 
the available information on current gross monthly earnings and the number of weekly 
hours of work in the main job.  We then adopted a conventional definition that 
classifies as low-paid those earning less than two-thirds of the median of the hourly 
wage distribution per year.  Such a relative measure is commonly used in the literature, 
since an absolute metric poses difficult conceptual and methodological problems for 
making international comparisons of the incidence of low pay (Employment Outlook, 
1996, p. 69).  Considering as low-paid those workers whose wages are less than two-
thirds of the median wage is also the accepted definition of the Institute of Labour 
(INE) of the Greek Confederation of Labour (GSEE) (Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 
2002).  Furthermore, given that the presence of part-time workers introduces the 
additional complexity of disentangling differences in time worked from differences in 
wage rates, hourly earnings were constructed in order to neutralize the effect of diverse 
working hours among part-time and full-time workers.  Using this definition, Table 1 
illustrates that the overall incidence of low-paid employment in Greece, based on 
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ECHP data for the period 1994-2001, is 17.24 percent.9  This figure closely mirrors the 
results of both Ioakimoglou and Soumeli (2002) and Marlier and Ponthieux (2000), 
who have shown, using slightly different definitions and data, that low wage workers 
in Greece amount to 16-17 percent of the total population.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Having identified the overall incidence of low pay in Greece, Table 2 depicts the 
composition of low wage employment in relation to categories of jobs and individuals.  
Specifically, Table 2 shows the percentage of workers in each category who are low-
paid (incidence), the distribution of low wage employment among the particular 
categories, and the concentration indicator, a measure of the prevalence of low-paid 
employment in each group relative to the overall incidence in the population.  This 
indicator is useful for conducting cross-national comparisons, as a value greater than 
one suggests a higher than average risk of being low-paid in any country.  Taking the 
category of ‘sector’ as an example, Table 2 illustrates that being employed in the 
private sector is associated with a higher than average probability of being low-paid, 
since the concentration value is 1.48.  This is in stark contrast to public sector workers, 
whose concentration value is 0.21, thus implying that the public sector in Greece acts a 
safeguard against low wage employment.  These figures are a reflection of the fact 
that, as shown in column 1, almost 26 percent of private sector employees are low-
paid, compared to only 4 percent in the public sector.  Moreover, from column 2 one 
 
9 It should be borne in mind, though, that in Greece there is a large number of atypical low-paid workers 
who are employed in the parallel economy, and who therefore do not form part of the official statistics.  
Thus, the 17 percent figure should be seen as a minimum estimate (Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 2002).  
Of course, it should be pointed out that low-wage employees do not necessarily live in low-income 
households.  In Greece, especially, “a person’s likelihood of being poor depends to a large extent on the 
income of his (closely knit) family and not exclusively on his individual income” (ibid., 2002).  Apart 
from the fact that workers’ households often have two wages, as well as the continued support by 
parents and the extended family, non-labour income (such as property income) is also common.    
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can see that among the 17 percent of workers who are classified as low-paid in our 
sample, 92 percent work in private sector jobs, compared to only 8 percent who are 
employed in the public sector.   
From the remaining rows in Table 2 it is clear that the likelihood of low-paid 
employment in Greece is higher for women and younger workers, as well as those with 
lower educational qualifications and absence of training opportunities in their jobs.  
This is not surprising, given that wages tend to increase with working experience, 
training, and the level of educational attainment, as has been noted long time ago by 
Becker (1964) and Mincer (1974), the two pioneers of human capital theory.  In fact, 
our sample confirms that low-paid workers have fewer years of general experience and 
job tenure (11 and 3.5, respectively), compared to their higher-paid counterparts (17 
and 9 years).  Single workers, and to a lesser extent those who work in part-time jobs 
are also at higher than average risk of being in the low pay category.  In addition, low 
wages are relatively less common in fairly ‘stable’ jobs, such as jobs with contracts of 
indefinite duration.  The persistence of the no pay/low pay cycle that was mentioned 
above is also evident, since those who enter or re-enter employment after being 
unemployed or inactive a year earlier are much more likely to be in low wage jobs, 
compared to those who were employed.  From Table 2 it is also apparent that fears of 
high-paid jobs in the shrinking manufacturing sector being increasingly replaced by 
low-paid jobs in the growing services sector have not yet materialized in Greece, as the 
possibility of low pay seems to be greater in the non-services sectors.  Lastly, the 
occupational breakdown suggests that while being in a non-manual occupation (such 
as sales) is not a guarantee of being in a relatively high-paid job, very few managerial, 
technical and professional workers receive low wages.  All of these correlations are in 
close agreement with the results that other authors have reported for many other 
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countries, thus indicating that the risk of low wage employment in Greece tends to be 
concentrated among the same types of workers and employment categories as 
elsewhere (Employment Outlook, 1996, p. 70; Marlier and Ponthieux, 2000, p. 4; and 
articles in the volume of Asplund, Sloane and Theodossiou, 1998).        
Moving on to an analysis of the raw job satisfaction data, Figure 1 demonstrates 
that in 2001 Greece had the lowest average job satisfaction among the EU countries for 
which such data was available, thus confirming the findings of Blanchflower and 
Oswald (1999) and Kaiser (2002) for earlier years.  From Figure 2, which illustrates 
the distribution of job satisfaction responses in Greece in 2001, it can be seen that 11 
percent of Greeks ranked themselves at the bottom of the job satisfaction ladder (i.e. 
gave a score of 1 or 2), while 59 percent were in the middle rungs (scores 3 and 4).  
The remaining 30 percent of Greek employees reported a satisfaction value of 5 or 6, 
which constitutes one of the smallest fractions in the EU.  Table 3 now depicts the 
means of overall job satisfaction and satisfaction with specific facets of jobs, broken 
down by various categories of interest for this study.  As an example, one can see from 
column 1 of this table that the average job satisfaction score of high-paid workers in 
Greece in the years 1994-2001 was 4.02, which is larger than the average satisfaction 
value of 3.17 that low-paid workers reported.  Accordingly, the following patterns 
emerge:  
 
• Men in Greece seem to be more satisfied with their pay and security, compared 
to women, in line with Papapetrou’s (2004) finding that average wages of Greek 
women are 25 percent less than those of men.  Nevertheless, women express greater 
satisfaction with their working hours, times, conditions, and type of work.  
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• While full-time workers report greater satisfaction with respect to their pay, 
security, and type of work, part-time employees in Greece receive greater satisfaction 
from their working hours and conditions.  Overall full-time workers seem to be happier 
than those who work part-time, which probably reflects the fact that part-time work in 
Greece is still limited and to a large extent involuntary.  Specifically, among the 5.34 
percent of employees who work in a part-time job in our sample, almost 47 percent 
declare that they do it because they were unable to find other work, while only 7.5 
percent preferred this type of working arrangement.  Furthermore, given that “part-
time employment in Greece is directly interwoven with low pay, low-skilled jobs, 
limited prospects of career development, low social benefits and partial insurance 
coverage which also entails low pension rights” (Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 2002), it is 
understandable why such workers report lower job satisfaction ratings.  
• Public sector workers in Greece are more satisfied with their jobs in general, 
and with all of the facets in particular, compared to private sector employees.  This is 
consistent with Papapetrou’s (2003, p. 45-7) finding that female and male wages in the 
Greek private sector are on average 37 and 34 percent less than in the public sector, 
respectively.  The high level of security satisfaction expressed by Greek public sector 
workers can also be explained by the element of permanency in such jobs.    
• Workers on permanent contracts receive greater utility from their jobs, 
especially with regards to the security of their employment, while those on casual work 
suffer the most. 
• Married individuals, those in possession of more human capital, those who are 
employed in supervisory positions, and those working in the services sector are more 
satisfied with all of the components of their jobs. 
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• Finally, and more important for the purposes of this study, low-paid workers in 
Greece are less satisfied with all aspects of their work compared to their high-paid 
counterparts.                     
5. Econometric Methodology and Results 
 
5.1 Statistical Methodology 
These correlations may be spurious, as the influence of other factors that may 
obscure the relationship between the low pay and job satisfaction variables has not yet 
been controlled for.  As shown above, we cannot be certain on the basis of the raw data 
only that low-paid workers in Greece are less satisfied than high-paid workers solely 
because of the fact that they are low paid.  Since a large proportion of low-paid 
workers possess other characteristics that might have a negative effect on job 
satisfaction (e.g. they are more likely to be single, low-skilled, on non-permanent 
contracts, etc.) it might be these features that cause low-paid workers to appear as less 
satisfied, rather than the fact of being low-paid itself.  Therefore, in order to uncover 
the true ceteris paribus effect of the low pay variable on job satisfaction, a multivariate 
regression methodology is required to net out the effects of other variables.   
As mentioned in section 3, the estimation of job satisfaction equations usually 
involves job satisfaction “as the dependent variable” being regressed on a set of 
demographic, human capital, economic, work-related and other social determinants.  In 
our case the set of independent variables also includes a dummy variable that 
distinguishes between high and low-paid workers by taking the value 1 for low-paid 
employees and 0 otherwise.  The estimated coefficient on this low pay variable 
uncovers the difference in average job satisfaction between high and low-paid workers, 
having controlled for the effect of all other factors that affect job satisfaction and that 
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may be correlated with low pay status.  Of course, given the difficulty of conditioning 
on every possible determinant of job satisfaction (since the researcher usually faces 
data constraints), it may be the case that the estimated coefficient on the low pay 
dummy also captures the effect of these ‘unobservable’ variables, and is thus biased.  
To give a relevant example, it is known by a number of studies that union density has 
an effect on job satisfaction, and that it is also a determining factor for the probability 
of a worker being low-paid.10  It follows that if a union-proxy variable is not included 
in the equation, the coefficient on the low pay dummy will also capture the effect of 
union status on job satisfaction, thus giving rise to what is known as ‘omitted variable 
bias’.  In the results that are presented below we have therefore made an attempt to 
correct for this problem, and the reader interested in the technical details of how we 
achieve this can find a discussion in the Appendix.  In what follows we offer a 
simplified account of the main results.   
 
5.2 Empirical Results for Overall Job Satisfaction 
From the estimation of a job satisfaction equation on the entire sample of workers 
(see Table A2 in the Appendix), we find that low-paid employees in Greece are 
significantly less satisfied with their jobs compared to those who are high-paid, all 
other things equal.11  Two ‘statistically identical’ individuals, who have the same 
characteristics, would therefore not be equally satisfied with their jobs if one of them 
worked in the low pay tier of the labour market and the other in the high pay tier.  In 
reality, the individual who is low-paid would, on average, receive lower utility from 
 
10 While union status has been found to increase worker satisfaction with pay and security, overall, 
union workers usually report less satisfaction compared to non-union workers (Lillydahl and Singell, 
1993).  Furthermore, low-union density is also generally considered as a factor that contributes to low-
paid employment (Ioakimoglou and Soumeli, 2002).   
11 Given that data for the type of contractual arrangement was not available for wave 1 in Greece, the 
regression output that is reported in this paper has been estimated on the basis of the 1995-2001 period. 
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his/her work.  This is evidence in favour of the dual labour market hypothesis, as it 
indicates that non-pecuniary benefits do not seem to compensate low wage workers in 
Greece, as would be expected in a labour market with perfectly competitive market 
forces.  The idea that there exist ‘bad jobs’ and ‘good jobs’ in the Greek labour market 
is therefore supported by our data.   
From the coefficients of Table A2 one can also derive an estimated value of the 
amount of money that low-paid workers in Greece would need to receive, in order to 
have their utility equalized to that of their higher-paid equivalents.  Alternatively, such 
a calculation allows us to put an approximate monetary value on the disutility of low 
pay employment in Greece i.e. on the ‘implicit’ (shadow) cost that workers are 
‘paying’ for being in low-paid jobs that are also of low quality.  This is done by 
looking at the relative size of the coefficients on the low pay and wage variables, as 
this provides information about how the wages of a marginal individual would need to 
change in the face of a change in his/her pay status, in order to keep his utility from 
work constant (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).  In our case, the calculus suggests 
that if a previously high-paid worker were to work in a low-paid job, he/she would 
need to be compensated with approximately 1,400drx extra per hour if he/she were to 
retain the same utility as before the change.  As an indication of the magnitude of this 
figure, one can note that the mean gross hourly wage of a low-paid worker in Greece 
in the years 1994-2001 was 826drx, while that of a high-paid worker was 2034drx.  
Thus, in order for a low-paid employee to enjoy the same utility as that of a higher-
paid counterpart, he/she would need to receive on average approximately (826+1400) 
2,226drx per hour.  It is therefore clear that equalizing the average wages of workers in 
the two tiers would not be enough to provide them with equal utility.  Rather, it would 
be necessary to offer low-paid workers an additional (2,226-2034) 192drx per hour, 
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presumably to compensate them for the fact that low-paid jobs are also of inherent 
‘bad’ quality.  Of course, these calculations should be treated cautiously, but they do 
illustrate the quantitative importance of the estimated coefficients.  
From the other explanatory variables we observe further that higher absolute wages 
have a significant positive effect on individual job satisfaction, consistent with the 
traditional income-leisure trade-off of microeconomic theory.12  Job satisfaction is also 
found to be U-shaped in age (thus confirming that the middle-aged are less satisfied), 
while we do not discover any significant effect of marital status or of the presence of 
young children in the household.  After conditioning on the main job and worker 
characteristics, we also find that Greek men are less satisfied with their jobs compared 
to women.  This might seem surprising, given that Papapetrou (2004) and others have 
found substantial and significant male-female earnings differentials across occupations 
and countries, while there is also evidence of discrimination against women in areas 
such as hiring/firing and promotion.  Nevertheless, the fact that women consistently 
report higher job satisfaction scores than men is well established in the literature.  
Attempts to explain this paradox have usually focused on the difference in aspirations 
between the two genders, with women supposedly expecting less from their jobs due to 
more frequent career breaks and previous discriminatory behaviour in the workplace.  
The narrower gap between their current working state and what women expect might 
therefore explain their greater happiness (Clark, 1997).   
 
12 The positive coefficient on total hours of work, however, is inconsistent with traditional 
microeconomic theory.  Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that we have not managed to exclude from 
our hours variable the effect of overtime (for which Greek employees receive up to 150% extra pay), 
and which in the low wage economy of Greece constitutes a recurrent and welcome element of workers’ 
income.  Thus, the positive impact of the hours variable on job satisfaction may reflect the fact that the 
compensatory wage effect of overtime outweighs the disutility of any additional hours of work.  The 
positive wage effect is further reinforced by the fact that the total hours variable also includes time 
worked in additional jobs.    
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Considering now the variables that capture the ‘stability’ or ‘precariousness’ of the 
employment relationship, it is found that temporary, part-time, and private sector 
workers in Greece are strongly dissatisfied compared to those on permanent, full-time, 
and public sector contractual arrangements.  These results seem to confirm popular 
worries that increased labour market flexibility affects the job security of employees, 
provided that only a minority of individuals who work on non-permanent and part-time 
contracts do so by choice.   
Significant differences in the subjective evaluation of jobs are also found among 
those who have different human capital characteristics.  In Greece, workers with 
tertiary education and above the second level of secondary education are more satisfied 
with their work, compared to those who have not completed the second stage 
secondary level.  This is also the case for workers who possess more job tenure, 
probably reflecting the positive impact of specific training or the superior quality of 
the worker-employer job match.  In addition, those who believe that their current job is 
not utilizing their skills to the full extent (i.e. self-reported over-qualification) have 
lower satisfaction scores than those who are content with their skills-job match.  The 
provision of training by employers as a means of upskilling and career development 
also leads to significantly higher job satisfaction.  Finally, very good health, which can 
also be considered a form of human capital in accordance with Mincer (1976), is an 
additional factor that leads to higher utility from work. 
Another important result that has surfaced from the econometric analysis is that the 
well-documented non-pecuniary costs of unemployment seem to exert a negative 
effect on workers’ satisfaction with their jobs.  This is evident by the fact that, 
everything else equal, an ‘ex-unemployed’ worker is more likely to be unhappy with 
his current job compared to someone who was employed a year earlier.  In contrast, 
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ex-inactive employees are happier with their current jobs, which is consistent with the 
fact that these people mostly consist of women and younger individuals.  This specific 
group is more likely to be in the process of entering or re-entering employment, after 
having taken some time off due to various care responsibilities or further education. 
Finally, there is also evidence that absenteeism, non-supervisory positions in the 
hierarchy and working outside of Attica negatively impacts on the perceived quality of 
jobs.           
 
5.3 Empirical Results for Facets of Job Satisfaction and by Sector 
Given that we have established that there exist significant differences in the 
perceived job quality among high and low-paid workers in Greece, which points 
towards the existence of a segmented labour market, we now proceed to investigate the 
reasons for this discrepancy.  To this end, seven satisfaction equations have been 
estimated with some of the available components of jobs (pay, security, type of work, 
working hours, working times, working conditions/environment and commuting) as 
dependent variables this time (see Table A3 in the Appendix).  The results indicate 
that, with the exception of travelling distance to work, low-paid workers are 
particularly less satisfied with their pay and the type of work that they perform.  
Negative coefficients are also found with respect to the remaining facets, though these 
are not significant at conventional statistical levels.  Overall these findings seem to 
support the assertion that low wage jobs in Greece are inherently of bad quality, 
though the insignificance of the working hours, security, and working conditions 
variables does point towards the existence of some compensating forces.                  
As an additional task we have split the sample into low and high-paid segments in 
order to unearth any differences in the manner in which the explanatory variables 
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determine the satisfaction of the two types of workers.  In the previous estimation of 
overall job satisfaction the coefficients of the chosen control variables were 
constrained to be the same for both low-paid and high-paid workers.  However, it may 
be the case that the individual’s type interacts with the other personal and workplace 
characteristics, in which case high or low-paid employees will report different 
satisfaction values to any of these given traits.  This disparity in the job satisfaction 
determination process would be possible if differences in institutional arrangements, 
hierarchical structures, and firm policies for the two types of workers existed. 
Estimating two separate job satisfaction equations for the high and low pay 
segments reveals a number of interesting features (see columns 2 and 3 of Table A2).  
Gender and working time arrangements only affect the utility of high-paid workers in a 
significant manner, with males or part-time workers being less satisfied.  General 
education and additional years of tenure also seem to exert an exclusive effect on the 
utility of the higher-paid, though employer-provided training is found to have a much 
larger marginal effect on the stated satisfaction of low-paid employees.  The negative 
impact of non-supervisory duties, previous unemployment, and of working in Northern 
or Central Greece, is only evident for the high-paid group.  In contrast, having been 
inactive a year earlier has a slight beneficial effect on the satisfaction of low wage 
employees.  Finally, those individuals on casual contractual arrangements suffer from 
a significantly larger negative effect on job satisfaction in the low wage tier of the 
labour market.  On the whole these results seem to imply that differences in personal 
and workplace characteristics among low-paid workers do not lead to significant 
deviations in perceived job quality as much as they do among employees in higher-
paid jobs. 
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5.4 Oaxaca decomposition 
Having estimated job satisfaction equations for the whole sample and for the two 
groups separately also allows for a breakdown according to standard Oaxaca or related 
decompositions.  By applying this methodology it is possible to investigate, firstly, the 
extent to which differences in job satisfaction among high and low-paid employees in 
Greece is attributable to the endowments or characteristics differential between them, 
and, secondly, what is the unexplained part of this discrepancy i.e. that part whereby 
two ‘identical’ individuals of average characteristics, one employed in a high-paid job 
and one in a low-paid job, report a different satisfaction value, possibly due to the 
presence of institutional factors.  Such a procedure is widespread in decomposing 
wage differences between various categories of interest (see Papapetrou, 2003 and 
2004 for a recent application of this technique to the Greek labour market), but, to the 
authors’ knowledge, has not yet been attempted with subjective satisfaction data.  The 
results that follow therefore constitute a significant novelty of this paper. 
Table A4 in the Appendix presents the breakdown of the difference in job 
satisfaction between high and low-paid employees for the entire sample.  The top 
section of the table, which decomposes the difference according to the Oaxaca 
procedure, illustrates that the most influential factor affecting the satisfaction disparity 
of individuals in the two groups is the fact that they have the different characteristics 
that were identified in this paper; this accounts for almost 90 percent of the total 
discrepancy.  The remaining 10 percent is ‘unexplained’, reflecting disparate 
institutional features of the high and low pay labour markets.  Given the greater weight 
of the endowments explanation, the bottom section of the table shows which part of 
the explained difference in satisfaction is attributable to specific employee 
characteristics.  While the difference in mean wages understandably explains the lion’s 
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share of the overall satisfaction differential (56%), tenure (3.5%), age (-9%), the sector 
of employment (12%), employer-provided training (3%), non-permanent contractual 
arrangements (16.5%), and tertiary education (4%) also contribute to the difference in 
satisfaction between high and low wage employees in Greece.         
6. Policies and Recommendations 
 
As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the aim of improving the quality of 
work is considered by the EU as closely interlinked with the move towards a 
competitive and knowledge-based economy, as stated in the Lisbon 2000 agenda.  This 
reflects the evidence of a strong positive correlation between job quality, faster 
employment growth and higher productivity.  At the same time, the declining 
economic prospects of workers on the lower rungs of the income distribution have 
raised concerns regarding the emergence of a two-tier labour market in Europe.  In this 
paper evidence was presented that low-paid workers in Greece do in fact seem to 
suffer from a double penalty, as their jobs are also of bad quality.  In view of this 
segmentation, combined with the fact that Greece remains a low wage economy, it 
becomes clear that policies that centre on the quality of jobs are of equal importance to 
those that focus on the level of pay that they provide.  This, however, requires the 
design of a regulatory framework that supports transitional labour markets, by 
improving the dynamics that lead to jobs of superior quality and by encouraging the 
occupational and regional mobility of those workers who are trapped in low wage/low 
quality employment.  Concerted efforts to promote life-long training and raise the 
qualifications of employees, to ease young workers’ access to the labour market, to 
open up possibilities for career advancement, and to strengthen measures that help 
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reconcile work and private and family lives would be conducive to achieving this goal 
(Employment in Europe, 2001, p. 80). 
The empirical findings of this paper illustrate that such policy implications are 
relevant for the Greek labour market as well.  The challenge of balancing flexibility, 
on the one hand, and security, on the other – of supporting the competitiveness of 
firms in the global economy without resorting to precarious forms of employment – is 
a delicate one for the Greek economy.  The fact that additional years of tenure do not 
have a significant impact on the perceived job quality of low wage workers may 
indicate the lack of rank progression or training opportunities in this sector.  In 
addition, since both temporary contracts and involuntary part-time work are generally 
related to extreme worker dissatisfaction, it becomes clear that emphasis should be put 
on making these contractual forms function as stepping stones for reintegrating 
individuals into high quality employment.  This can be achieved by focusing on 
increasing the share of voluntary part-time work, as well as introducing more 
flexibility in permanent contracts and more security in fixed-term ones.  
Implementation of the EU Directives for Temporary and Part-time work is also 
essential to ensure that workers under different contract statutes enjoy similar access to 
lifelong learning, good working conditions, appropriate protection against 
discrimination or unfair dismissal, support in the case of job loss, decent pay, and the 
right to transfer acquired social rights in the case of job mobility (Commission, 2003, 
p. 14).   
Policies that enhance the quality and efficiency of investments in human resources 
are also relevant, given that higher educational attainment and more employer-
provided training leads to a better perception of quality at work.  However, the fact 
that more educational qualifications do not contribute to additional utility from work in 
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low wage jobs may reflect the discomfort of educated low-paid workers whose higher 
job aspirations have not materialized as expected.  This highlights the need for general 
education and vocational training systems that do not contribute to skills mismatches 
in the labour market. 
The strong negative correlation between absenteeism and job quality may also 
partly reflect the need for better working conditions with more health and safety, given 
that lost days at work are usually a consequence of accidents at work, work-related 
illnesses and occupational diseases.  In this respect the EU has called for an 
intensification of efforts aimed at implementing the provisions of the Health and 
Safety at Work Directives. 
Finally, policies that allow employees to adjust work with their working time 
preferences, and in particular with their other responsibilities such as care for children 
and other dependants, would also add to the improvement in quality of jobs.  In Greece 
there is currently little flexibility in working time arrangements, with more than 90 
percent of all employees working on fixed start and end times.  Moreover, about 30 
percent of Greek employees work outside core working hours, compared to an EU 
average of 20 hours, while more than half of them claim that they work in the evening 
at least sometimes (Employment in Europe, 2003, p. 148).  These facts point to the 
need for policies that will reconcile the work-life balance in Greece in a more 
satisfactory fashion.  
7. Conclusions 
 
Following the establishment of job quality as one of the three overarching 
objectives of the EU’s Employment Guidelines, and in the face of concerns regarding 
the declining economic prospects of workers on the lower rungs of the income 
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distribution, which has supposedly led to the emergence of a two-tier labour market in 
Europe, this study examined whether or not significant differences in perceived job 
quality exist among high and low-paid workers in Greece.  To do so we followed the 
practice of an ever-increasing number of economists who use self-reported job 
satisfaction data to proxy the overall quality of work as perceived by the individual 
worker.  Using data from the eight waves of the ECHP, evidence was presented that 
low-paid workers in Greece do in fact seem to suffer from a double penalty, as their 
jobs are also of bad quality.  Further analysis of the specific facets of jobs revealed that 
this fact is the result of lower average satisfaction among low wage employees with 
their pay and the type of work that they perform.  In view of this segmentation, 
combined with the fact that Greece remains a low wage economy, it becomes evident 
that policies that centre on the quality of jobs are of equal importance to those that 
focus on the level of pay that they provide.  This, however, requires the design of a 
regulatory framework that supports transitional labour markets, by improving the 
dynamics that lead to jobs of superior quality and by encouraging the occupational and 
regional mobility of those workers who are trapped in low wage/low quality 
employment.  
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TABLE 1 Median wages, thresholds, and low wage workers 
 in Greece, 1994-2001 
    
Year Median Threshold Low-paid 
    
1994 1214.674 809.7827 17.7 
1995 1269.095 846.0635 16.65 
1996 1448.031 965.3543 16.8 
1997 1630.435 1086.957 17.66 
1998 1702.517 1135.011 16.62 
1999 1760.87 1173.913 16.9 
2000 1795.196 1196.797 18.46 
2001 1835.228 1223.485 17.22 
1994-2001 1550.311 1033.541 17.24 
 
Notes: Amounts quoted in drachmas (not adjusted for inflation); The threshold refers to 2/3rds of the median of the 
gross hourly wage distribution; The last column indicates the proportion of employees whose wages are below the 
threshold; 
Source: own calculations using ECHP UDB;  
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TABLE 2 Incidence, distribution and concentration of low-paid  
employment in Greece, 1994-2001 
      
Category   Incidencea Distributionb Concentrationc
      
Total   17.24 100 1 
By sex      
Female   22.69 49.93 1.32 
Male   13.9 50.07 0.81 
By age      
16-25   47.37 40.41 2.75 
26-35   16.35 29.56 0.95 
36-45   9.06 15.02 0.53 
46-55   8.97 10.47 0.52 
56-65   14.41 4.55 0.84 
By marital status     
Not married  30.6 61.31 1.77 
Married   10.18 38.69 0.59 
By working time status    
Part-time   19.08 5.9 1.11 
Full-time   17.18 94.1 1.00 
By sector      
Sector: public  3.66 8.22 0.21 
Sector: private  25.55 91.78 1.48 
By position in hierarchy    
Supervisory  2.29 0.84 0.13 
Intermediate  4.15 1.8 0.24 
Non-supervisory  18.99 97.35 1.10 
By contractual arrangement    
Permanent  10.65 49.03 0.62 
Fixed/short term  24.79 12.84 1.44 
Casual/no contract  44.27 37.21 2.57 
Other arrangement  26.73 0.92 1.55 
By training incidence    
No training/education  21.93 76.91 1.27 
Training/education  9.53 23.09 0.55 
By educational attainment    
Tertiary   6.78 12.06 0.39 
Second stage secondary 18.71 40.43 1.09 
Below second stage secondary 24.67 47.51 1.43 
By health     
Very good   17.72 72.76 1.03 
Good   15.34 19.78 0.89 
Fair   19.23 6.13 1.12 
Bad   20.23 0.98 1.17 
Very bad   36.11 0.36 2.09 
By status last year     
Employed   14.14 73.09 0.82 
Self-employed   16.75 0.90 0.97 
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Unemployed   45.10 12.48 2.61 
Inactive   49.59 13.54 2.87 
By industry     
Agriculture  44.44 3.81 2.58 
Industry   18.69 32.09 1.08 
Services   15.67 64.1 0.91 
By occupation     
Legislators/managers 4.25 0.58 0.25 
Professionals  3.41 3.38 0.20 
Technicians/associate prof. 11.01 5.47 0.64 
Clerks   10.63 11.32 0.62 
Service and Sales  31.61 26.17 1.83 
Skilled agriculture/fishery 38.06 2.74 2.21 
Craft/trade  23.2 25.39 1.35 
Plant/machine operators 13.47 7.83 0.78 
Elementary  30.14 17.12 1.75 
      
Notes: Low pay is defined as less than 2/3rds of median hourly earnings of all employees aged 16-65. 
aPercentage of workers in each category who are low-paid. 
bPercentage share of all low-paid employment in each category. 
cIncidence of low-paid employment in each category divided by overall incidence of low-paid employment.  A value greater 
than 1 indicates a higher than average risk of being low-paid, while a value less than 1 indicates a smaller probability. 
  38
TABLE 3 Mean Job Satisfaction Scores for all Greek employees, 1994-2001 
 
         Overall Pay Security Type work Hours Times Conditions Commuting
Low-paid          3.17(1.23) 2.60(1.05) 3.01(1.39) 3.44(1.31) 3.46(1.23) 3.57(1.24) 3.63(1.31) 4.02(1.36)
High-paid 4.02(1.17)        3.39(1.09) 4.25(1.44) 4.15(1.24) 4.14(1.14) 4.12(1.23) 3.98(1.29) 4.15(1.33)
         
By sex          
Female          3.87(1.24) 3.21(1.14) 4.00(1.53) 4.08(1.27) 4.07(1.18) 4.12(1.24) 4.17(1.23) 4.13(1.35)
Male          3.88(1.22) 3.29(1.11) 4.06(1.50) 3.99(1.29) 3.99(1.19) 3.97(1.26) 3.77(1.33) 4.12(1.32)
By age          
16-25          3.55(1.21) 2.96(1.08) 3.36(1.38) 3.77(1.27) 3.77(1.20) 3.78(1.23) 3.88(1.28) 4.07(1.32)
26-35          3.81(1.19) 3.20(1.09) 3.88(1.47) 4.01(1.25) 3.95(1.18) 3.95(1.25) 3.93(1.29) 4.01(1.35)
36-45          4.03(1.21) 3.35(1.11) 4.31(1.47) 4.14(1.26) 4.13(1.18) 4.12(1.27) 3.96(1.30) 4.24(1.32)
46-55          4.00(1.22) 3.40(1.15) 4.34(1.49) 4.11(1.29) 4.16(1.15) 4.17(1.21) 3.92(1.30) 4.18(1.32)
56-65          3.83(1.33) 3.32(1.23) 4.10(1.63) 3.91(1.43) 4.03(1.23) 4.05(1.30) 3.80(1.45) 4.14(1.36)
By marital status         
Not married 3.70(1.24)        3.08(1.11) 3.67(1.49) 3.90(1.29) 3.87(1.19) 3.90(1.24) 3.91(1.30) 4.02(1.33)
Married          3.97(1.21) 3.35(1.11) 4.23(1.49) 4.09(1.27) 4.10(1.17) 4.09(1.26) 3.93(1.31) 4.18(1.33)
By working time status         
Part-time  3.37(1.51)        2.58(1.19) 3.37(1.79) 3.93(1.49) 4.05(1.42) 4.22(1.34) 4.00(1.36) 4.21(1.43)
Full-time          3.91(1.20) 3.29(1.11) 4.07(1.48) 4.03(1.27) 4.02(1.17) 4.01(1.25) 3.92(1.30) 4.12(1.33)
By industry         
Agriculture       2.89(1.27) 2.56(1.11) 2.64(1.47) 2.84(1.35) 3.20(1.21) 3.18(1.32) 2.91(1.41) 3.93(1.45)
Industry          3.57(1.20) 3.15(1.11) 3.57(1.45) 3.68(1.28) 3.89(1.15) 3.94(1.20) 3.47(1.32) 3.99(1.33)
Services          4.04(1.20) 3.33(1.12) 4.28(1.47) 4.21(1.23) 4.10(1.18) 4.09(1.26) 4.14(1.23) 4.19(1.33)
By sector          
Sector: public 4.38(1.10) 3.52(1.10)       4.91(1.30) 4.48(1.16) 4.44(1.09) 4.38(1.22) 4.19(1.25) 4.32(1.34)
Sector: private 3.58(1.19) 3.10(1.10)       3.50(1.37) 3.75(1.27) 3.77(1.17) 3.81(1.23) 3.76(1.31) 4.00(1.32)
         
By job status 
Supervisory       4.66(1.02) 3.93(1.14) 5.00(1.14) 4.75(1.10) 4.32(1.22) 4.37(1.27) 4.44(1.26) 4.37(1.40)
Intermediate       4.35(1.07) 3.53(1.13) 4.69(1.33) 4.48(1.14) 4.15(1.18) 4.19(1.30) 4.09(1.30) 4.20(1.40)
Non-supervisory         3.79(1.22) 3.19(1.10) 3.92(1.50) 3.93(1.28) 3.99(1.18) 3.98(1.24) 3.87(1.30) 4.10(1.32)
By contractual 
arrangement         
Permanent       4.10(1.10) 3.46(1.04) 4.50(1.26) 4.24(1.17) 4.17(1.09) 4.13(1.19) 4.07(1.22) 4.19(1.29)
Fixed/short term 3.50(1.15) 3.10(1.06)       2.74(1.23) 3.75(1.26) 3.78(1.12) 3.80(1.16) 3.77(1.29) 4.06(1.31)
Casual/no contract 2.88(1.08) 2.60(1.01)       2.44(1.08) 3.12(1.21) 3.33(1.14) 3.44(1.18) 3.27(1.28) 3.85(1.27)
Other arrangement 3.75(1.12) 3.39(1.11)       3.49(1.34) 3.85(1.36) 3.75(0.97) 3.86(1.12) 4.09(1.27) 4.34(1.26)
By training incidence         
No training/education 3.62(1.22) 3.13(1.09)       3.76(1.50) 3.72(1.28) 3.87(1.17) 3.88(1.23) 3.73(1.30) 4.07(1.30)
Training/education         4.27(1.12) 3.46(1.14) 4.44(1.42) 4.46(1.15) 4.24(1.17) 4.23(1.26) 4.20(1.25) 4.20(1.38)
By educational 
attainment         
Tertiary          4.35(1.13) 3.53(1.14) 4.56(1.40) 4.61(1.11) 4.33(1.14) 4.40(1.19) 4.34(1.17) 4.20(1.37)
Second stage secondary 3.89(1.15) 3.29(1.07)       4.05(1.45) 4.03(1.21) 4.01(1.15) 3.97(1.24) 4.02(1.25) 4.13(1.30)
Below second stage 
secondary 3.43(1.22)        2.97(1.09) 3.53(1.50) 3.48(1.27) 3.75(1.19) 3.74(1.24) 3.42(1.32) 4.04(1.33)
By health         
Very good  3.94(1.21) 3.32(1.11) 4.06(1.48)      4.08(1.26) 4.05(1.17) 4.04(1.24) 3.99(1.28) 4.16(1.31)
Good          3.77(1.19) 3.15(1.10) 4.00(1.53) 3.94(1.28) 3.94(1.19) 3.97(1.26) 3.79(1.30) 4.03(1.35)
Fair          3.61(1.37) 2.93(1.24) 3.84(1.71) 3.71(1.43) 4.01(1.26) 4.01(1.35) 3.61(1.48) 4.05(1.49)
Bad          3.50(1.51) 2.79(1.24) 3.90(1.87) 3.59(1.53) 4.09(1.40) 4.11(1.37) 3.57(1.48) 4.13(1.56)
Very bad  3.66(1.70) 2.88(1.23) 4.02(1.85)      3.97(1.46) 4.02(1.64) 4.00(1.80) 3.27(1.76) 4.30(1.67)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Own calculations based on ECHP UDB (1994-2001) data 
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Appendix  
 
This section provides a detailed discussion of the model specification and 
econometric procedure that underpins the results that were presented in the main body 
of this paper.  We have followed an increasingly popular trend in the economics 
literature, which estimates regression models based on subjective data.  Given the 
ordinal nature of such data, most of this research uses ordered probit regression 
techniques with the aim of identifying the main determinants of self-reported well-
being levels.  Specifically, it usually seeks to identify the probability of observing a 
self-reported satisfaction value i (i = 1, 2,…, k), as a function of appropriate individual 
and labour market variables.  In our case, where the interest lay in revealing potential 
differences in job satisfaction between high and low-paid workers, we have also 
included in the regressions a dummy variable indicating whether or not individuals are 
low-paid.  The estimated coefficient on the low pay dummy will then unveil any 
differences in job satisfaction between the two groups of workers, ceteris paribus.  In 
other words, we have estimated a model of the form: 
 
JS Xb Ia u= + +  (2) 
 
 
where JS, job satisfaction, is the categorical dependent variable, X is a vector of 
personal and labour market characteristics that affect job satisfaction, I is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if low-paid and 0 otherwise, and u  ~ N (0, σi2) is the 
random disturbance term.  Of course, if there exist unobservable variables that affect 
job satisfaction and are correlated with the low pay dummy (i.e. if Cov(I, u)  0), then 
it is well known that the estimated coefficient a will be biased.   
≠
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It is for this reason that a “treatment effects model” has been utilized, which 
considers the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment on another 
endogenous continuous variable, conditional on two sets of independent variables.  
Such techniques use either Heckman's two-step consistent estimator or full maximum-
likelihood, and estimate all of the parameters in the model 
 
JS Xb Ia u= + +  (regression equation) (3) 
 
1I iff Z 0γ ε= + >  (treatment equation) (4) 
 
 
where equation (3) is defined as before, Z is a matrix of identifying variables believed 
to determine whether assigned treatment in the low wage sector occurs or not, but with 
at least one not affecting job satisfaction, ε ~ N (0, 1) and Cov (ε, u) = ρ.  A point 
worth making at this stage is that since these models require that the dependent 
variable is continuous, we have transformed the ordinal job satisfaction variable into a 
standardized z-score.  This is standard procedure following Freeman’s (1978) finding 
that such a transformation does not lead to distortions in the regression results.  It 
should also be noted that in all of the regressions robust (Hubert-White) standard 
errors are reported that also correct for correlation at the individual level.  
Identification of the model is achieved provided that at least one non-overlapping 
variable in Z, compared to X, is present.  For this purpose two identifying restrictions 
have been used in the selection equation, but not in the main job satisfaction equation.  
These consist of, firstly, dummy variables capturing the number of rooms in the 
household per person, ranging from 1 to more than 3 rooms.  Secondly, dummies of an 
index summarizing the presence of good features in the household have also been 
 41
 42
                                                
included.  The good features consist of whether or not the dwelling possesses a 
separate kitchen, bath or shower, indoor flushing toilet, hot running water, and a place 
to sit outside.  For both of these identifiers it is postulated that while their existence is 
correlated with the probability of an individual belonging in the low-paid group, it is 
uncorrelated with the utility that he receives from his work.  Additional statistical tests, 
which are discussed in more detail below, also indicate that the restrictions for 
identifying the endogeneity effects are adequate.   
The estimation of the selection equation (4) makes use of the probit method to 
identify the factors that determine whether an individual works in the low pay or high 
pay tier.  The regression results, as well as the marginal effects of the included 
variables, are presented in Table A1.13  As usual, positive coefficients imply a greater 
likelihood of an individual having low wages, whereas the marginal effects indicate 
the change in the probability that an individual is low-paid when each of the 
independent variables, calculated at the mean values of the sample, is increased by one 
unit.  For instance, if an employee works full-time the probability that he/she will be 
low-paid decreases by almost 4 percent, while being employed in the private sector 
increases the likelihood of low pay employment by 7 percent.   
In line with the results of many other studies (see articles in volume of Asplund, 
Sloane, and Theodossiou, 1998) it is also revealed that the probability of being in the 
low wage group in Greece is U-shaped in age (so that the middle-aged are less likely to 
be low-paid), and negatively related with marriage and with the male gender.  In 
addition, greater human capital reduces the chances of an individual falling into the 
low pay category, since more years of tenure, higher educational qualifications, and 
those who receive training are more likely to receive higher wages.  The fact that there 
 
13 A description of all of the variables that are used in this study can be found in Appendix Table A5. 
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is a negative correlation between those who have children under the age of 12 in the 
household and low wage employment confirms the Malthusian rationale of income 
being a crucial determinant of fertility patterns.  Furthermore, those who are employed 
in non-supervisory positions, on non-permanent contracts, and who suffer from very 
bad health are more likely to be low-paid.  Finally, the widespread concerns over the 
presence of a vicious circle between low pay and no pay are verified by the fact that 
individuals who were unemployed or inactive a year earlier face a higher probability of 
being in the low pay category.   
With respect to the identifying restrictions now, it is clear that these are highly 
correlated with low pay status.  Specifically, compared to those who live in households 
with only one room per person, those with two or more than three rooms per person 
are less likely to be low-paid.  Accordingly, those with fewer good household features 
face a greater likelihood of being low-paid.  The Wald test statistic for the joint 
significance of these selection variables in the probit equation is χ2 (6) = 59.59, which 
is significant at the 1 percent level.    
Following the estimation of the probit model, the predicted probabilities of being 
in the low pay segment are then calculated.  The predictions are subsequently included 
in the regression of the main job satisfaction equation, in place of the low pay dummy.  
The estimates that have been corrected for endogeneity are depicted in Table A2, and 
have been extensively discussed in section 5.2 above.  It is noteworthy, though, that 
the implementation of this technique leads to an increase in the marginal effect of the 
low pay dummy, compared to a simple application of OLS (not available here, but 
available from the author upon request).   
In Table A3 estimates of the impact of the low pay determinant on the facets of job 
satisfaction (pay, security, type of work, working hours, working times, working 
conditions/environment and commuting) are presented, using treatment effect 
modelling as above.  The application of this two-step empirical procedure once again 
results in coefficients that differ with respect to OLS estimates.  Specifically, while the 
OLS output does not reveal any significant effect of low pay status on the individual 
facets of job satisfaction (not reported here), the estimates that are corrected for 
endogeneity are significant for pay and type of work at the 5 percent level as discussed 
in the main text.   
Statistical tests that examine the adequacy of the restrictions that identify the 
endogeneity effects were repeatedly undertaken.  Regressions were run in each case to 
ascertain statistically that our chosen instruments are uncorrelated with the job 
satisfaction measures that were used.  Specifically, the variables used as identifying 
restrictions were entered as regressors in the job satisfaction equations together with 
the other covariates.  In all regressions the instruments as a group did not add any 
significant explanatory power as tested by an F test.  The relevant F statistics are 
reported at the end of their respective tables. 
Given the desire to investigate whether the explanatory variables exert a 
differential effect on the satisfaction of the two types of workers, a Heckman-type 
selection correction model was employed for both the low pay and high pay sample.  
This model, commonly known as a “switching regression model with endogenous 
switching”, was most notably espoused by Lee (1978). 
The switching regression model consists of two job satisfaction equations, one for 
each sector: 
 
    Hi i H HJS X b u= + i   (5) 
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Li i L LiJS X b u= +  (6) 
 
  
and one “selection equation”, which determines which sector the individuals ends up 
in: 
 
 45
i
*
i iI Z γ ε= +  ( 7) 
 
where I* is a latent variable which describes the agent’s propensity of joining each 
sector, and Z is a vector of variables determining the employee’s selection, at least one 
not affecting his job satisfaction.  Of course, I* is unobserved, but we know that: 
 
*1 0i iI iff I= >  (8) 
 
*0 0i iI iff I= ≤  (9) 
 
Thus, our observed JS data are defined as follows: 
 
1i Li iJS JS iff I= =  (10) 
 
0i Hi iJS JS iff I= =  (11) 
 
( , , )
1
HH HL H
Hi Li i HL LL L
H L
Cov u u
ε
ε
ε ε
σ σ σ
ε σ σ σ
σ σ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
(12) 
 
and it is evident that since , estimation by 
OLS will result in inconsistency. 
*( / 0) 0 ( / 0) 0Li i Hi iE u I and E u I> ≠ ≤ ≠*
The estimation of the selection equation therefore follows the probit method, and 
then the coefficients from the probit are used for the calculation of the inverse Mill’s 
ratio, as is illustrated in the following two steps: 
 
Firstly, from (7) we retrieve γˆ  from which we construct  
 
ˆ( )( , )
ˆ( )L L
ZCov u
Zε
φ γσ ε γ= × Φ  
(13) 
 
and 
  
ˆ( )( , )
ˆ1 (H H
ZCov u
)Zε
φ γσ ε γ= × − Φ  
(14) 
 
Secondly, the job satisfaction equations are estimated including the respective Mill’s 
ratios as independent variables, as follows: 
 
Hi i H HJS X b ε Hiσ η= − +  (15) 
 
Li i L L LiJS X b εσ η= − +  (16) 
 
    
The estimated coefficients of bH and bL should now provide unbiased estimates of the 
effect of X.  The estimates reported in columns 2 and 3 of Table A2 have therefore 
allowed for this correction.    
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TABLE A1 Probit estimates of low pay status in Greece, 1995-2001 
 
 (1)Low pay (2)Marginal effect  
    
Personal    
Male -0.555 -0.067  
 (0.054)***   
Age -0.138 -0.015  
 (0.015)***   
Agesq 0.002 0.000  
 (0.000)***   
Married -0.278 -0.032  
 (0.059)***   
Child < 12yrs -0.181 -0.019  
 (0.055)***   
Unemployed 5yrs 0.069 0.008  
 (0.048)   
Work-related    
Tenure -0.033 -0.004  
 (0.005)***   
Total hours -0.555 0.004  
 (0.054)***   
Full-time 0.041 -0.043  
 (0.002)***   
Private -0.317 0.073  
 (0.101)***   
Absenteeism 0.760 0.001  
 (0.092)***   
Duties    
Intermediate 0.128 0.015  
 (0.191)   
Non-supervisory 0.572 0.043  
 (0.165)***   
Contract    
Fix/short term 0.274 0.035  
 (0.062)***   
Casual work 0.540 0.079  
 (0.052)***   
Other 0.259 0.034  
 (0.221)   
Human Capital    
Training -0.160 -0.016  
 (0.051)***   
Overqualified 0.052 0.006  
 (0.040)   
Third level -0.352 -0.034  
 (0.079)***   
2nd secondary -0.128 -0.013  
 (0.055)**   
Health    
Good 0.043 0.005  
 (0.046)   
Fair 0.133 0.016  
 (0.087)   
Bad/Very Bad 0.262 0.034  
 (0.194)   
Status last year    
Self-employed -0.117 -0.011  
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 (0.159)   
Unemployed 0.311 0.041  
 (0.064)***   
Inactive 0.353 0.048  
 (0.070)***   
Region    
Northern GR 0.293 0.034  
 (0.058)***   
Central GR 0.105 0.011  
 (0.063)*   
Aegean islands 0.092 0.010  
 (0.077)   
Identifying variables    
2 rooms pp -0.304 -0.027  
 (0.064)***   
> 3 rooms pp -0.399 -0.031  
 (0.155)**   
< 2 good features 0.515 0.081  
 (0.158)***   
3 good features 0.443 0.065  
 (0.096)***   
4 good features 0.224 0.026  
 (0.062)***   
5 good features 0.069 0.007  
 (0.052)   
Constant 0.407   
 (0.396)   
    
Observations 15213   
Wald test (58) 1914.64***   
Pseudo R2 0.37   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of 
individuals over time; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; All regressions include 
controls for occupation (9), industry (10) and time (7); Reference groups: duties: supervisory; contract: 
permanent; education: below 2nd stage; health: very good; status last year: employed; region: Attica; rooms pp: 
1 room pp; good features: 6; 
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TABLE A2 Εstimates of overall job satisfaction in Greece, 1995-2001 
 
 (1) All (2) Low-paid (3) High-paid 
    
Lowpay -0.138   
 (0.062)**   
Personal    
Male -0.067 -0.061 -0.080 
 (0.023)*** (0.072) (0.025)*** 
Age -0.017 -0.034 -0.012 
 (0.008)** (0.019)* (0.009) 
Agesq 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000) 
Married -0.025 0.046 -0.042 
 (0.027) (0.072) (0.028) 
Child < 12yrs 0.030 -0.012 0.036 
 (0.021) (0.058) (0.022)* 
Unemployed 5yrs -0.027 -0.039 -0.022 
 (0.022) (0.044) (0.025) 
Work-related    
Lnpay 0.409 0.356 0.410 
 (0.030)*** (0.081)*** (0.034)*** 
Tenure 0.004 -0.000 0.003 
 (0.002)** (0.006) (0.002)* 
Total hours 0.010 0.013 0.010 
 (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.001)*** 
Full-time 0.197 0.146 0.206 
 (0.045)*** (0.096) (0.050)*** 
Private -0.200 -0.240 -0.188 
 (0.027)*** (0.133)* (0.028)*** 
Absenteeism -0.007 -0.015 -0.005 
 (0.003)** (0.008)* (0.003) 
Duties    
Intermediate -0.116 0.274 -0.120 
 (0.043)*** (0.235) (0.044)*** 
Non-supervisory -0.171 0.201 -0.173 
 (0.038)*** (0.226) (0.038)*** 
Contract    
Fix/short term -0.274 -0.274 -0.276 
 (0.033)*** (0.068)*** (0.038)*** 
Casual work -0.412 -0.484 -0.347 
 (0.029)*** (0.065)*** (0.034)*** 
Other 0.041 -0.151 0.124 
 (0.082) (0.180) (0.089) 
Human Capital    
Training 0.096 0.232 0.076 
 (0.019)*** (0.059)*** (0.019)*** 
Overqualified -0.157 -0.177 -0.154 
 (0.017)*** (0.041)*** (0.018)*** 
Third level 0.085 0.015 0.096 
 (0.033)** (0.088) (0.036)*** 
2nd secondary 0.078 0.049 0.081 
 (0.026)*** (0.055) (0.028)*** 
Health    
Good -0.154 -0.064 -0.168 
 (0.020)*** (0.049) (0.021)*** 
Fair -0.089 -0.013 -0.101 
 (0.042)** (0.091) (0.046)** 
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Bad/Very Bad -0.057 -0.120 -0.038 
 (0.102) (0.230) (0.112) 
Status last year    
Self-employed -0.068 -0.122 -0.062 
 (0.072) (0.157) (0.082) 
Unemployed -0.070 -0.008 -0.111 
 (0.037)* (0.060) (0.049)** 
Inactive 0.069 0.127 0.003 
 (0.042)* (0.066)* (0.055) 
Region    
Northern GR -0.079 -0.108 -0.065 
 (0.023)*** (0.063)* (0.025)*** 
Central GR -0.077 -0.063 -0.081 
 (0.026)*** (0.067) (0.028)*** 
Aegean islands -0.003 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.031) (0.072) (0.034) 
Constant -2.985 -2.800 -3.065 
 (0.288)*** (0.662)*** (0.331)*** 
    
Observations 15206 2433 12773 
Wald test(d.f) 4324.43(54)*** 651.00(53)*** 2079.14(53)*** 
Log-likelihood -22502.52 -7274.33 -19421.28 
lambda  0.09 -0.08 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals 
over time; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; The ordinal dependent variable overall job 
satisfaction has been transformed to a continuous z-score variable; All regressions include controls for occupation 
(9), industry (10) and time (7); Column 1 includes Heckman estimates, where the selection is a probit regression of 
the treatment lowpay dummy as in Table A1.  Column 2 includes Heckman ML estimates of the job satisfaction of 
low-paid workers.  Column 3 includes Heckman ML estimates of the job satisfaction of high-paid workers; Reference 
groups: duties: supervisory; contract: permanent; education: below second stage; health: very good; status last 
year: employed; region: Attica; F test statistic for the joint significance of the identifying restrictions in an overall job 
satisfaction regression: F (6, 4044)  = 1.53; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A3 Estimates of effect of low pay status on facets of job satisfaction in Greece, 1995-2001 
 
 (1)Pay       (2)Security (3)Type work (4)Hours (5)Conditions (5)Times (6)Commuting
        
Lowpay -0.188       -0.011 -0.113 -0.042 -0.046 -0.034 0.178
 (0.094)**       -0.053 (0.058)** -0.058 0.096 -0.075 (0.093)*
        
Observations 15213       15213 15213 15213 15213 15213 15213
Wald test (54) 3015.77***       9639.1*** 3683.91*** 2486.37*** 2152.64*** 2111.51*** 715.76***
Log-likelihood -23017.7       -20605.33 -22829.87 -23531.61 -23704.82 -23911.2 -24667.64
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and the repeat sampling of individuals over time; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Results 
for the remaining explanatory variables are available from the authors upon request; All columns include Heckman ML estimates, where the first step is a probit regression of the treatment lowpay 
dummy on the regressors of the underlying regression model and the chosen selection variables; The ‘Times’ and ‘Conditions’ regressions have been estimated using only rooms pp as selection 
variables, whereas the rest use the good household features dummies as well; F-test statistics for the joint significance of the selection variables in each job satisfaction regression: Pay - F(6, 4044) 
= 0.90; Security - F(6, 4044) =  1.62; Type Work - F(6,  4044) = 1.61; Hours - F( 6, 4044) = 1.56; Times - F(6, 4044) = 0.39; Conditions – F(2, 4044) = 1.64; Commuting - F(6, 4044) = 0.32. 
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TABLE A4 Oaxaca Decomposition of Job Satisfaction Difference  
between High and Low-paid Workers in Greece 
  
Raw differential 0.727 
(mean JShigh - mean JSlow)  
  
Due to Endowments 0.601 
Due to Coefficients 0.076 
Due to Interaction 0.05 
  
Decomposition of explained difference 
  
Lnpay 0.336 
Age -0.055 
Agesq 0.045 
Tenure 0.022 
Private 0.074 
Training 0.017 
Fixed contract 0.015 
Casual work 0.100 
Tertiary education 0.023 
Notes: Estimation using Oaxaca decomposition method. 
Source: own calculation using ECHP UDB (1994-2001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
TABLE A5 Description of variables  
 
Variable  Description 
   
Job Satisfaction scores (1 = ‘not satisfied’, 6 = ‘fully satisfied’) 
 
Overall Job Satisfaction  respondent satisfaction rating with work or main activity 
Job Satisfaction: facets  
 
respondent satisfaction rating of facet i of present job (i  = earnings, 
job security, type of work, number of working hours, working times, 
work conditions/environment, distance to work/commuting) 
   
Identifying variables   
   
1 room pp  1, if individual lives in household with 1 room per person (not counting kitchen, bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise 
2 rooms pp  1, if individual lives in household with 2 rooms per person (not counting kitchen, bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise 
3 rooms pp  1, if individual lives in household with more than 3 rooms per person (not counting kitchen, bathroom and toilets), 0 otherwise 
   
< 2 good features  1, if accommodation individual lives in has less than two good features, 0 otherwise 
3 good features  1, if accommodation individual lives in has 3 good features, 0 otherwise 
4 good features  1, if accommodation individual lives in has 4 good features, 0 otherwise 
5 good features  1, if accommodation individual lives in has 5 good features, 0 otherwise 
6 good features  1, if accommodation individual lives in has 6 good features, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
   
   
Job and Personal Characteristics   
   
Lowpay  1, if individual is low-paid, 0 otherwise 
Lnpay  natural log of gross hourly wage of main job (including overtime) 
Age  age of respondent at date of interview 
Agesq  age squared 
Tenure  job tenure at date of interview 
Married  1, if individual is married, 0 otherwise 
Male  1, if gender is male, 0 otherwise 
Hours  Total number of hours worked per week (in main plus additional jobs, including paid overtime) 
Child < 12yrs  1, if household has 1 or more children under 12, 0 otherwise 
Unemployed 5yrs  1, if individual has been unemployed during 5 years before joining the survey, 0 otherwise 
Full-time  1, if main job is full-time, 0 otherwise 
Private  1, if current job is in the private sector, 0 otherwise 
Absenteeism  Days absent from work cause of illness or other reason during last 4 working weeks, not counting holiday weeks 
Human Capital   
Training  1, if individual had formal training or education that gave skills needed for present type of work, 0 otherwise 
Overqualified  1, if individual feels has skills or qualifications to do more demanding job than the one has now, 0 otherwise  
Below second stage secondary  1, if highest level of general or higher education completed is less than second stage of secondary education, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Second stage secondary  1, if highest level of general or higher education completed is second stage of secondary education, 0 otherwise  
Third level  1, if highest level of general or higher education completed recognised third level education, 0 otherwise  
Duties   
Supervisory  1, if job status in current job is supervisory (omitted), 0 otherwise 
Intermediate  1, if job status in current job is intermediate, 0 otherwise 
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Non-supervisory  1, if job status in current job is non-supervisory, 0 otherwise 
Contract   
Permanent  1, if employment contract in main job is permanent, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Fixed/short term  1, if employment contract in main job is fixed term or short-term, 0 otherwise 
Casual work  1, if employment contract in main job is casual work with no contract, 0 otherwise 
Health   
Health: very good  1, if health in general is very good, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Health: good  1, if health in general is good, 0 otherwise 
Health: fair  1, if health in general is fair, 0 otherwise 
Health: poor  1, if health in general is poor, 0 otherwise 
Health: very poor  1, if health in general is very poor, 0 otherwise  
Status last year   
Employed  1, if most frequent activity last year was employment, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Self-employed  1, if most frequent activity last year was self-employment, 0 otherwise 
Unemployed  1, if most frequent activity last year was unemployment, 0 otherwise 
Inactivity  1, if most frequent activity last year was inactivity, 0 otherwise 
Region   
Attica  1, if region in which the household is situated is Attica, 0 otherwise (omitted) 
Northern GR  1, if region in which the household is situated is Northern Greece, 0 otherwise 
Central GR  1, if region in which the household is situated is Central Greece, 0 otherwise 
Aegean Islands, Crete  1, if region in which the household is situated are the Aegean Islands or Crete, 0 otherwise 
   
Other controls   
Industry  
a set of 10 dummies for one-digit industry, taking the value 1 if the 
respondent’s job belongs to the corresponding industry classification, 
0 otherwise.  The one-digit industries include: Agriculture; Mining 
and Manufacturing; Construction; Retail and Trade; Hotels and 
Restaurants; Transport and Communication; Financial Services; 
Public Administration; Education; Health, social services and other 
(omitted: Agriculture)  
   
Occupation  
a set of nine dummies for one-digit occupation, taking the value 1 if 
the respondent’s job belongs to the corresponding occupational 
classification, 0 otherwise.  The one-digit occupations include: 
Legislators, Senior officials and managers; Professionals; 
Technicians and associate professionals; Clerks; Service and Shop 
and market sales workers; Skilled agricultural and fishery workers; 
Craft and related trades workers; Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers; Elementary occupations (omitted: Elementary 
occupations) 
   
Year  
a set of seven dummies taking the value 1 for observations that 
belong to the corresponding wave of the ECHP, 0 otherwise.  Years 
of sample include: 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2001 and 2001 
(omitted category: 1995)  
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